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, Andrew Lugg University of Nevada Las Vegas , USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Sloan Lansdale University of Maryland , USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Shannon Carcelli University of Maryland , USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 2, June 2024, sqae060, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae060
Published:
16 April 2024
Article history
Received:
19 January 2023
Revision received:
14 November 2023
Accepted:
15 March 2024
Published:
16 April 2024
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Andrew Lugg, Sloan Lansdale, Shannon Carcelli, The Politics of International Peace and Security: Introducing a New Dataset on the Creation of United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Bodies, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 68, Issue 2, June 2024, sqae060, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae060
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Abstract
This paper introduces new data on the creation of subsidiary bodies (SBs) by members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) between 1972 and 2020. Delegation to SBs is one of the principal means through which the UNSC acts, and these bodies are designed to carry out crucial functions such as peacekeeping, implementing sanctions, and investigating crises. Yet, no research has systematically evaluated their creation, design, and use. Our dataset includes a typology of all proposed and created SBs as well as information about their purpose and design. After introducing the data, we empirically analyze the determinants of SB creation. Multivariate regression demonstrates that SBs are more likely to be created when the preferences of the permanent members are aligned. Moreover, stronger bodies are more likely to be created during periods of high preference alignment, while middle- and lower-strength bodies are less influenced by member alignment. These results provide unique evidence demonstrating how politics affects the choice of when and how the UNSC responds to global problems. Our data and analysis paint a picture of a more proactive UNSC than is commonly portrayed in the literature, and these data will enable scholars to further analyze UNSC action.
Este artículo presenta nuevos datos sobre la creación de Órganos Subsidiarios (OS) por parte de los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas (CSNU) entre 1972 y 2020. La delegación en los OS es uno de los principales medios a través de los cuales actúa el CSNU. Estos órganos están diseñados para llevar a cabo funciones cruciales como el mantenimiento de la paz, la aplicación de sanciones y la investigación en materia de crisis. Sin embargo, no existe ninguna investigación que haya evaluado sistemáticamente su creación, diseño y uso. Nuestro conjunto de datos incluye una tipología de todos los OS propuestos y creados, así como información sobre su propósito y diseño. Después de presentar estos datos, analizamos empíricamente los determinantes de la creación de los OS. La regresión multivariable demuestra que es más probable que se creen OS cuando las preferencias de los miembros permanentes se encuentran alineadas. Además, resulta más probable que se creen organismos más fuertes durante los períodos de alineamiento de mayor preferencia, mientras que los organismos que tienen una fuerza media o baja se encuentran menos influenciados por el alineamiento de los miembros. Estos resultados proporcionan pruebas únicas que demuestran cómo la política afecta la elección en materia de cuándo y cómo responde el CSNU a los problemas globales. Nuestros datos y análisis ofrecen una imagen de un CSNU más proactivo de lo que comúnmente se describe en la literatura. Estos datos permitirán a los académicos analizar más a fondo las acciones del CSNU.
Cet article présente de nouvelles données sur la création d'organes subsidiaires (OS) par les membres du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (CSNU) entre 1972 et 2020. La délégation à des OS constitue l'un des principaux moyens d'action du CSNU. Ces organes sont conçus pour exercer des fonctions cruciales comme le maintien de la paix, la mise en œuvre de sanctions et l'enquête sur des crises. Pourtant, aucun travail de recherche ne propose d’évaluation systématique de leur création, conception et utilisation. Notre ensemble de données comprend une typologie de toutes les propositions et créations d'OS, ainsi que des informations quant à leur finalité et leur conception. Une fois les données présentées, nous analysons de façon empirique les déterminants de la création des OS. La régression multiple démontre que la probabilité de création d'OS augmente quand les membres permanents partagent les mêmes préférences. De plus, des organes forts seront plus souvent créés dans les périodes où les préférences convergent grandement, tandis que les organes de puissance faible à intermédiaire subissent moins l'influence de l'alignement des membres. Ces résultats mettent en évidence de manière singulière l'influence de la politique sur le choix de la date et du mode de réponse aux problèmes mondiaux par le CSNU. Nos données et notre analyse dépeignent un CSNU plus proactif qu'il ne figure généralement dans la littérature ; ces données permettront aux chercheurs d'analyser plus avant les mesures du CSNU.
© The Author(s) (2024). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
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